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ABSTRAC T 
This r epor t  documents a Space Shuttle Safety Analysis Study regarding 
the relative magnitude of hazards of s e r  ie s ver sus par al le l  propellant loading 
within a 75 -minute t ime per iod. 
It was concluded that, under the conditions of equal total propellant 
loading t ime,  par al le l  loading is potentially more  hazardous than se r i e s  
loading; this is due to (1) the greater  explosion potential of the propellants 
in the vehicle tanks during the ent i re  loading operation, and (2  ) the s irnul- 
taneous relatively high flow ra te s  in the loading lines. However, it was also 
determined that by reducing the paral lel  loading time to approximately one- 
half the s e r i e s  loading t ime,  the higher hazard associated with paral lel  
loading could be reduced to an acceptable value. Since this would requi re  a 
sys tem size approximately equal to that necessary  for se r i e s  loading, the 
economic advantage of paral lel  loading would be negated. 
However, if it is assumed that only a relatively smal l  percentage of 
vehicles will require  a shor t  reaction time on the launch pad, then, the lower 
cost of paral lel  loading can be real ized by designing a smaller  sys tem and 
operating it in s e r i e s  for a normal  loading time of 150 minutes. Where 
minimum reaction time is required,  the propellants could be loaded in 
approximately 75 minutes by operating the same sys tem in paral lel  a t  a 
relatively smal l  additional r isk.  
PREFACE 
This study was initiated a s  Subtask 2, Dual Propellant Loading of the ; 
Space Shuttles to NASA Study C-11, Advanced Missions Safety Studies. Other 
studies in this s e r i e s  a r e :  Subtask 1, TNT Equivalency Study, Aerospace 
Report  No. ATR-71(7233)-4; and, Subtask 3, Orbiting Propellant Depot 
Safety Study, Aerospace Report  No. ATR-71(7233)-3. 
The study was supported by NASA Headquarters and managed by the 
Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight. Mr. Herbert  
Schaefer , a s  the study monitor,  provided guidance and counsel that signifi- 
cantly aided this effort. 
The resu l t s  of the study a r e  presented in two volumes: Management 
Summary Report  (Volume I) and Technical Discuss ion (Volume 11). The 
Management Summary Report (Volume I) presents  a br ief ,  concise review of 
the study content, and summar  izes the pr incipal conclus ions and r e  com- 
mendations. The Technical Discuss ion (Volume 11) is the principal volume, 
It provides a discuss  ion of the relative magnitude of hazards  of a se r  ies 
ve r sus  paral le l  propellant loading sys t em for the Space Shuttle. Suggested 
design and procedural  c r i t e r i a  that would tend to minimize hazards a r e  
provided where appropriate.  Also included is a cons ideration of equalizing 
the hazard  levels associated with the two loading sys t em concepts. A 
composite sys tem,  capable of either se r i e s  o r  paral le l  operation, is sug- 
ges ted as  des irable. 
- iv- 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A feasibility and economic study of a propellant loading sys tem 
required to meet  a two-hour launch reaction time for the Space Shuttle 
was conducted during 1969, using Saturn V propellant loading sys tem 
experience (Ref. 1). Feas ible propellant loading sys tems were  synthe- 
s ized to provide loading within a one-hour t ime period a s  required to 
conduct pre-launch operations within two hours.  The relative cost  of 
simultaneous (paral lel)  loading of the LH and LO2 propellants was com- 2 
pared to the cost  of sequential ( s e r i e s )  loading of the two propellants. 
It was concluded that, for the one-hour loading time period, parallel  
loading would allow cost  reductions of $12 million or  approximately 30 
percent of the total sys tem cost  assuming a new propellant loading facility. 
Since the method of propellant loading employed on al l  presently 
known vehicles using LH2 and LO2 has been in s e r i e s ,  hazards created 
by paral lel  loading required extens ive evaluation. Since par allel  loading 
has the advantage of smal ler  flows to load within a given time period, a 
study of the relative hazards was conducted with the purpose of assessing 
the relative hazards of the two loading methods and establishing the feasi-  
bility of providing compensating provisions for potential failures.  It 
was believed that in this manner ,  data could be derived in this study to 
determine which method of loading to use. 
Flight vehicle requirements  such as  propellant quantities and loading 
t imes were  based on a contractor proposal for the Phase B Space Shuttle 
Study. Propellant loading systems were  synthesized based on the previous 
study (Ref. 1 ) which included loading sequences, propellant loading ra t e s ,  
sys tem schematics,  and comparisons of a new system versus a modifica- 
tion of KSC Pad 39 system. 
The hazard analysis included identification of the types of hazards, 
their possible causes and effects, and the gross criticality of the hazard. 
The relative criticality of the effects in a ser ies  and a parallel method 
loading system was then assessed by comparing the relative probability, 
time criticality, and consequences of the identified failures for the two 
methods. Where differences in criticality in the two methods of loading 
occurred, the hazards and possible effects were summarized and the feasi- 
bility of compensating for the respective differences in hazards was evaluated. 
If compensation was found feasible, the necessary provisions were indicated. 
Cons ideration was given to both the ground propellant loading hazards and 
the hazard potential of the fluids s tored in the vehicle. 
11. FLIGHT VEHICLE BASELPNE 
The North American Rockwell Proposal  to accomplish Phase B Space 
Shuttle Study was utilized to establish the vehicle baseline (Ref. 2). Although 
this was but one of seve ra l  a l ternate  configurations considered, it was judged 
that the selection of only one particular configuration would not significantly 
al ter  the resu l t s  and conclusions considering the level of the depth of this 
s tudy . 
The baseline sys t em configuration, shown in Fig. 1, consists of a 
booster -orbiter combination sized to a g ross  lift-off weight l imit  of 3 .  5 
million lb. The orbi ter  configuration has a 200-mi cross- range  and a pay- 
load capability of 45,000 lb. Alternate configurations with a high c r o s s -  
range orbi ter  should not mater ial ly  affect the resu l t s  of the study. The 
booster and orbi ter  a r e  mated in the configuration shown in Fig. 1, and 
both use L O ~ / L H ~  propellants. It is assumed that there  a r e  no intercon- 
necting propellant lines between the orbi ter  and booster ,  o r  between the 
orbi ter  and payload. 
The main propulsion propellant s torage for the booster consists of one 
LH tank and one LO tank. Both tanks a r e  made of 22 19 - T8 1 aluminum 2 2 
alloy. The LH2 tank is insulated internally with closed-cell  polyurethane 
foam with a layer  of fiberglass reinforcement to protect the surface of the 
foam f r o m  damage and to inhibit permeation of the foam by the LEI2. The 
LO2 tank is uninsulated; a dry  nitrogen purge is requi red  to inhibit ice 
formation on the tank during pre-launch servicing. Thermally driven, 
natural  convective circulation i s  utilized for  the LO2 manifolds to eliminate 
geysering and to precondition a l l  but the 15-ft-long individual engine feed 
ducts. It should be noted that the LO tank is located in the forward section 2 
of the booster.  The booster is 257 f t  in overal l  length with the pad support 
points 218 ft f rom the nose. The top of the LO2 tank is a t  an elevation head 
of 184 ft above the launch pad support level. The booster a l so  requi res  L H ~ /  
LO2 for its attitude control propulsion sys t em and auxiliary power unit. 
BOOSTER I 
RISE-OFF DISC 
PANEL SUPPORT 
Fig,  I ,  Integrated Booster  /Orb i te r  Configuration 
The basic propellant storage system configuration for the orbiter is 
similar to that described for the booster except that two tanks a r e  used for 
storage of the main propulsion system LOZ. Tank materials and insulation 
techniques a r e  the same a s  those used on the booster. In addition to the 
main propulsion system, LH /LO propellants a r e  also required for the 2 2 
orbiter attitude control and orbit  maneuvering propulsion systems. 
Table 1 indicates the quantities of propellants required by the booster 
and orbiter.  Although propellant loading for payloads a r e  not considered a 
part  of this study, in consideration of a worse case situation for propellant 
loading systems requirements,  the payload is assumed to be loaded for a 
resupply mis sion a s  a propellant tanker. For compar is on, the quantities 
required by the Saturn V vehicle have been indicated. It should be noted 
that although more than twice a s  much liquid hydrogen is required by the 
Space Shuttle as  by the Saturn V vehicle, an almost inverse situation exists 
with regards to liquid oxygen. In order  to synthesize the loading system 
requirements,  it was assumed that no special conditioning such a s  sub- 
cooling of the propellants was required. It was also assumed that the inter - 
faces between the propellant loading system and the vehicle exist a t  the base 
of each segment. 
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111. PROPELLANT LOADING SYSTEM MODE LING 
PROPELLANT STORAGE 
Table 2 indicates the propellant s torage requirements .  The s torage 
capacity was s ized for the loading and launching of two vehicles without 
requiring replenishment of the s torage tanks. The fir s t  vehicle cons is ts  
of a booster ,  o rb i te r ,  and an orbi ter  payload. The payload consists of 
propellant tanks that would be used for the orbiting propellant depot. The 
s torage tanks were  s ized to contain quantities of fluid that would be required 
to load the vehicles, plus sufficient quantities to compensate for boiloff, 
other losses ,  and potential hold periods. It was assumed that the f i r s t  
vehicle to be launched would be the p r imary  vehicle, and that the second 
vehicle would se rve  a s  a potential r e scue  mission craft .  This second vehicle 
would per form the rescue  on a vehicle of the fir s t  type and would therefore 
neither contain a payload such a s  a tanker,  nor the additional propellants 
required by the tanker.  It was a l so  assumed that the hold per iod for the 
r e scue  mission would be kept to a maximum of 45 min, since this launch 
would be taking place under emergency conditions. 
Based upon the configurations shown, the total quantities s tored  in the 
tanks, including 20 percent contingencies, would be 2.38 and 0.86 million 
gallons of LH and LO2, respectively.  If a completely new facility were  2 
to be built, s torage tanks with these capacities would be required. If Cape 
Kennedy Pad 39 were  to be modified, an additional s torage capacity of 1. 55 
million gallons of LH would have to be added to the existing capacity of 2 
0. 85 million gallons. No storage capacity would have to be added to the LO2 
system, since the existing capacity of 0. 90 million gallons is adequate to 
mee t  space shuttle requirements .  
B. LOADING TIMELINES 
The propellant loading sys t em timeline for s e r i e s  loading and paral le l  
loading a r e  i l lustrated in Figs.  2 and 3, respectively.  Both t imelines a r e  
based on the 75-min loading t ime discussed in Ref. 2. For  the s e r i e s  loading 



sequence, it can be noted that simultaneous fast-fill of LH and LO does not 2 2 
occur ,  and chilldown of the LH sys tem takes place during rapid loading of 2 
the LO2. Because of this, it is of importance to recognize the major 
differences between s e r  ies and paral lel  loading. 
During paral lel  loading, simultaneous rapid loading of the LH2 and 
LO occurs;  whereas in s e r i e s ,  the rapid loading is performed sequentially. 2 
However, the respective flows of the LH and LO a r e  higher in ser ies .  2 2 
C. SYSTEM SIZING AND CONCEPTS 
Table 3 summarizes  the loading t imes shown on the timelines f rom 
which the flow ra te s  were  computed. These flow ra te s  were then used to 
s ize the propellant loading sys tem lines used to t ransfer  the fluids f r o m  
storage tanks to the vehicles. The sizing was based on obtaining a minimum 
cost sys tem as  discussed in Ref. 1. 
1. LO2 System 
A schematic for a concept of a 'lnewll LO loading sys tem is depicted 2 
in Fig. 4. It can be noted that the storage tank has a capacity of 0. 90 million 
gallons. Pressurizat ion for t ransfer  is provided by pumps based on the 
study in Ref. 1, which indicated that a pumping sys tem would be more  
economical than a pressur ized  t ransfer  system. A smal l  pump and a 4-in. 
vacuum jacketed line a r e  provided for low flow conditions. A larger  pump 
and uninsulated line, s ized a t  12 in. for  the se r i e s  method of loading and 
8 in. for the paral lel  method, a r e  provided for rapid loading. The drain 
basin is used to receive drainage f r o m  the lines and boiloff gases f rom both 
the lines and the vehicles. Draining of vehicle tanks, if required,  would 
consist  of utilizing the fill lines a s  drain lines and returning the LO to the 2 
storage tank. 
Figure 5 shows a Cape Kennedy Pad 39 LO2 sys tem modified to pe r -  
f o r m  the same  function a s  the new system. Whereas the new sys tem would 
have a 4-in. vacuum jacketed low-flow line, the existing Pad 39 sys tem 
incorporates a 6-in. vacuum jacketed line. For rapid flow conditions, the 



existing 14-in. uninsulated line a t  Pad 39  is s ized slightly l a rge r  than 
the new sys tem would requi re  for s e r i e s  operations. 
With the exception of the somewhat l a rge r  l ines incorporated within 
the Pad 39  modified system, relatively l i t t le difference in the a r e a  of 
potential hazard  is noted between the new LO sys tem and the modified 2 
Pad 39 LO sys tem since the same flow r a t e s  wo- ' prevail .  Therefore,  2 
in further analysis of hazards,  no distinction will be made between the new 
and the modified system. 
2. LHZ System 
Figure 6 shows a concept for  a new LH2 loading system, again based 
on the analysis performed in Ref. 1. The s torage capacity of the sys tem is 
2 . 4  million gallons, and t ransfer  is by means of pressurizat ion of the 
storage tank using vaporizers .  For  s e r i e s  t ransfer ,  the 14-in. vacuum 
jacketed line would be required;  whereas,  paral le l  t ransfer  would requi re  a 
10-in. vacuum jacketed line. The f i l l  and drain sys tem indicated is used 
to drain l ines ,  and also provides disposal of boiloff gases  s imi lar  to the 
concept of the LOZ system. Drainage of the vehicle would be accomplished 
by utilizing the fill lines back into the LH2 storage tank. 
For  comparison, a modified Pad 39 sys t em is shown in Fig. 7. It can 
be noted that a new storage capacity of 1. 55 million gallons is added to the 
existing s torage capacity of 0.85 million gallons. The combined capacity 
of the two storage tanks is equal to that of the new system. In order  to 
obtain the required rapid flow r a t e s ,  a new 10-in. vacuum jacketed line 
must  be added to the existing 10-in. vacuum jacketed line at Pad 39 ,  The 
total capacity of the two 10-in. lines would be equivalent to the 14-in. single 
line for the new system. 
F r o m  the standpoint of potential hazard  of the two LH2 sys tems,  insuf - 
ficient difference was noted between the modified and new sys tem concepts to 
allow distinction in haza.rd level;  therefore,  both the modified and the new 
LH sys tem will a lso be t reated equally in the hazard  analysis that follows. 2 


IV. HAZARD ANALYSIS 
A. APPROACH 
The basic  approach used in conducting the hazard  analysis was to 
identify potential hazards and then to determine possible causes and effects 
of those hazards (Ref. 3 ) .  It was assumed that the s e r i e s  method of operation 
and the type of sys tems synthesized a r e  acceptably safe, since they have been 
patterned after types of sys tems current ly in use. The approach was there - 
fore based upon assess ing  the relative difference in hazards between sex ies 
and paral le l  loading. 
The gross  level of each hazard  was classified in one of the following 
categories in accordance with NASA Office of Manned Space Flight Directive 
No. 1 SPD-1A (Ref. 4) :  
"A" - Safety Catastrophic Condition(s ) such that environment, 
personnel e r r  o r ,  design charac ter i s t ics ,  procedural  
deficiencies, or subsystem or  component malfunction 
will severely degrade sys t em performance, and cause 
subsequent sys t em loss ,  death, or  multiple injuries to 
personnel. 
B" - Safety Crit ical  - Condition(s ) such that environment, 
personnel e r r o r ,  design charac ter i s t ics ,  procedural 
deficiencies , o r  subsys t em or component malfunction 
will cause equipment damage or personnel injury, or  
will  r e su l t  in a hazard requiring immediate correct ive 
action for personnel or sys  t em survival. 
"C" - Safety Marginal - Condition(s) such that environment, 
personnel e r r o r ,  design character  is t ics ,  procedural 
deficiencies, or  subsystem failure or  component mal -  
function will degrade sys t em performance but which 
can be counteracted or controlled without major damage 
or any injury to personnel. 
"D1' 
- Safety Negligible - Condit ion(s ) such that personnel 
e r r o r ,  design charac ter i s t ics ,  procedural deficiencies, 
or subsystem failure or component malfunction will 
not produce sys t em -Functional damage or  personnel 
injury. 
The relative criticality of the hazard effects was evaluated using a 
system outlined in Ref. 5. The criticality classes were designated as :  
" P I 1  - Probability of failure 
" T" - Time criticality relative to reaction time available 
"C" - Consequence of the failure if uncompensated for 
Each of these three classes was considered independently and the fol- 
lowing ranking was used. Where the criticality of either parallel or se r i es  
was greater ,  the symbol "6" was placed in the respective column. Where 
the criticality was considered to be the same,  the symbol "S" was used, and 
where it was considered to be less ,  the symbol "L" was placed in the 
respective column. In this manner,  an assessment of the relative cr i t i -  
cality of hazards in parallel or se r i es  loading methods was indicated relative 
to the effect of a given hazard. 
B. HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
Tables 4a through 4h indicate an assessment  of al l  hazards and possible 
causes and effects that were considered in this study. The following explana- 
tion is offered to allow an understanding of the rationale used in arriving a t  
the assessments  shown in these tables. The left hand column labeled "'Hazards'" 
defines in alphabetical order the types of hazards which might occur. The 
next column labeled "Possible Causes" defines the events in the operation of 
the system that potentially could cause the hazard. The column labeled 
"Possible Effects" indicates the effect on the system if the event that causes 
the potential hazard occurs . 
In some cases a specific condition is l isted as  a hazard; in others,  as  a 
cause or effect. For example, an explosion may be an effect of "Structural 
Damage or  Failure" listed as  a hazard; conversely, under the hazard 
labeled "Explos ion, 'I s t ructural  damage may be listed as one of the effects. 
At the same time, an explosion may be the cause of s tructural  damage. The 
interrelationship of hazards, causes, and effects makes the elimination of 
duplication difficult. However, redundancy was considered preferable to 
inadequate coverage of hazards. 
The column labeled "Hazard Assessment"  classifies the relative 
crit icali ty of the different effects. The column labeled "Rationale" was 
added in order  to explain the logic that was used to a r r i v e  a t  the relative 
a s ses smen t  of crit icali ty where differences between s e r i e s  and paral le l  
loading methods appeared. As an example, in Table 4a under the hazard 
labeled "Acceleration, " a possible cause of "opening or  closing the shutoff 
valves '' i s  noted. Rapid operation of a valve a t  relatively high flow r a t e s  
can produce a p res su re  surge ,  however, a p res su re  surge by itself  does 
not necessar i ly  present  a hazard  in a properly designed system. For  th.is 
reason,  the g ross  hazard level was classified as  "C-Safety Marginal" with 
its associated definition. F r o m  a cons ideration of crit icali ty relative to 
probability of fai lure ,  t ime, and consequence, it was considered that the 
given p res su re  surge would have equal crit icali ty in a paral le l  or s e r i e s  
system. Therefore,  no differences between par a l le l  and s e r  ies loading 
methods relat ive to this effect were  noted. 
The same  opening or  closing of the shutoff valve and p res su re  surge 
can r e su l t  in an excessive p res su re  in the system. This effect was labeled 
a s  "B-Safety Crit ical" since an excessive p res su re  can produce damage unless 
compensating devices a r e  built into the system. As previously noted, the 
consequences of such an effect  a r e  r a t ed  on the basis  of the uncompensated 
failure. It was judged that the probability and t ime crit icali ty of the 
excessive p res su re  effect would be approximately equal in both the paral le l  
and s e r i e s  sys tems.  However, the consequence was considered to be grea ter  
in the se r i e s  sys tem,  since for the s e r i e s  operation higher rapid load flow 
r a t e s  a r e  requi red  to p e r f o r m  the loading. A given closing t ime of a valve 
would, a s  a resu l t ,  produce a higher sys t em p ressu re  in the s e r i e s  sys t em 
than in the paral le l  sys  tem. 
The effect labeled "Structural Fai lure  of Fluid Containing Components 
can be explained in a s imilar  manner .  The g ross  hazard  rating in this case  
is "A" since a s t ruc tura l  fa i lure  is considered a catastrophic condition. The 
probability of occurrence  in either s e r i e s  or paral le l  was judged to be 
Table 4a. Hazard Assessment 
ACCELERATION 
(ANY F L U I D  MASS UNDER - 
GOING A CHANGE IN 
VELOCITY. ) 
CONTAMINATION 
I (ENTRY O F  CONTAMINATES 
N INTO SYSTEM) 
w 
I 
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  - 
CHANCE IN FLOW CONTROL \ / PRESSURE SURGES 
VALVE POSITION 
OPENING OR CLOSURE O F  I \ EXCESSIVE PRESSURE S H U T O F F  VALVES 
CHANGE IN LINE OR PASSAGE D E F L E C T I O N  O F  PLUMBING 
S I Z E  AND COMPONENTS 
CHANGE IN F L U I D  DENSITY \ I STRUCTURAL FAILURE O F  OR CHANCE O F  PHASE O F  F L U I D  CONTAINING CRYOGEN COMPONENTS 
P U N P I N G  ACTION I \ CAVITATION LOSS O F  CONTROL O F  
F L U I D  F L O W  
INCORRECT OPERATING ENTRY O F  AIR AND O T  'ER 
PROCEDURES CONTAMINATES INTO SYSTEM 
POOR MAINTENANCE P R O -  \ F R O Z E N  AIR MAY DETONATE CEDURES IN LH SYSTEM CAUSING STRUETRUAL DAMAGE AND I ] F I R E  
CONTAMINATED F L U I D  CLOGGING AND/OR BLOCKING 
S U P P L Y  O F  F I L T E R S ,  ORIFICES, VALVES 
REGULATORS, LINES, E T C .  
CONTAMINATED P U R G E  GAS SCORING AND ABRASION O F  
S U P P L Y  CLOSELY F I T T E D  MOVING 
SURFACES. 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES. 
P T C P T C  
C S s s s s s  
C S s s s s s  
A S L L S G G  
B S S S S S S  
NEGATIVE PRESSURE IN SYSTEh4 
ICILTRATION SYSTEM OVER - 
LOADED 
SOLVENT RESIDUAL 
POOR QUALITY CONTROL 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION T I M E  CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
A S S S S S S  
C S s s s s s  
C S s s s s s  
RATIONALE - 
-- 
HIGHER F L O W  RATES 
HIGHER F M W  R A T E S  AND 
LESS T I M E  T O  R E A C T  
NO SIGNIFICANT D I F F E R E N C E  
NOTED. 
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
approximately the same. The consequence of the s tructural  failure was 
assessed as  greater in the ser ies  system than in the parallel system, 
since the ser ies  lines a r e  larger  and higher flow ra tes  exist. Since a 
structural  failure in one of the lines of the ser ies  system would resul t  in 
more  spillage of fluids, the reaction time was also judged greater .  
The hazard labeled llContaminationll pertains to the entry of contaminants 
into the system. It was judged that the criticality of the effects showed no 
significant difference in either the se r i es  or parallel methods of loading. 
Similarly, no significant differences were noted under the hazard labeled 
llCorrosionll shown in Table 4b. The lack of significant differences in these 
areas  can be explained by noting that the somewhat la rger  line size and the 
higher rapid flow ra tes  of the ser ies  system have no direct  relationship to 
the effects of these hazards. 
In the a rea  of "Electrical" hazards, a difference was noted for the 
effect of interrupting the communications due to an electr ical  failure. If 
such interruption of communications should occur in the ser ies  method of 
loading, a greater time criticality was assigned. The higher flow rate 
that exists in that method would require a faster  reaction time to limit the 
consequence of the failure. It was assumed that the interruption of com- 
munication could occur a t  the same time a s  another type of failure, hovgever, 
the probability of this type of occurrence should be quite low. 
The hazard area  of "Explosion1' shows some of the more significant 
differences between the ser ies  and parallel methods of loading (Table 4c). 
As an example, for the effect labeled "Structural Damage of Propellant 
Loading System" the gross hazard level of this failure was assessed a s  
class  "A" since it has the potential of being catastrophic. The probability 
of failure in either the ser ies  or parallel method of loading would be approxi- 
mately the same. If a single failure occurred, i. e., a failure in one of the 
fluid lines, the consequence of failure and time criticality would be greater  
in the se r i es  system. In this case, however, it is assumed that an explosion 
will be produced by the structural  damage. If an explosion occurs during the 
Table 4b. Hazard Assessment 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
HAZARDS 
-- 
POSSIBLE CAUSES __ 
- - 
POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES RATIONALE 
P T C P T C  
CONT. CONTAMINATION M E T A L  AND/OR ELASTOMER FRICTION BETWEEN SLIDING C S S S S S S  NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCl  
( INTERNAL GENERATION P A R T I C L E S  SURFACES. NOTED. 
O F  CONTAMINATES) CONCENTRATING O F  VALVES SEA? ING INTER - C S S S S S S  
CONTAMINATES F E R E N C E  AND DAMAGE. 
IMPACT O F  F A S T  MOVING A S S S S S S  
P A R T I C L E S  MAY IGNITE IN 
LO SYSTEM CAUSING 
S T ~ U C T U R A L  DAMAGE AND 1 \ F I R E  
CORROSION 
(DETERIORATION O F  
MATERIAL OR 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN 
MECHANICAL P R O P E R T I E S )  
INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS 
AS DESIGNED 
LEAKAGE 
DAMAGED PROTECTIVE 
SURFACES OR COATINGS. 
E L E C T R O L Y T I C  CORROSION 
(DISSIMILAR METALS) 
CONDENSATING O F  
ATMOSPHERIC MOISTURE 
S A L T  ATMOSPHERE 
CONTAMINATION O F  T H E  
SYSTEM. 
BINDING O F  MOVING 
SURFACES. 
C s s s s s s  
REDUCTION IN MATERIAL B S S S S S S  
STRENGTH.  
DEGRADATION IN PHYSICAL B S S S S S S  
AND CHEMICAL P R O P E R T I E S .  
E L E C T R I C A L  CONTACT WITH LIVE CIRCUIT PERSONNEL:  ELECTROCUTION,  B S S S S S S  
(SHOCK, THERMAL, BURNS, I N T E R F E R E N C E  WITH 
INADVERTENT ACTIVATION, PERFORMANCE ANDETC..  
'OURCE DEGRADATION, REMOVAL OR E T C .  ) ICNITIOW SOURCE FOR R S S S S S S  DAMAGE O F  INSULATION DETONABLE OR COMBUSTIBLE 
M I X T U R E O F H Y D R O G E N  AND 
OXYGEN 
SHORT CIRCUITS BURNOUT AND/OR DAMAGE O F  B S S S S S  
EQUIPMENT 
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION TIME CRITICALiTY 
C - CCNSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
NO SIGNIFICANT D I F F E R E N C E  
NOTED. 
G - GREATER 
S - S A N E  
L - LESS 
Table 4c. Hazard Asses srnent 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
HAZARDS 
CONT. E L E C T R I C A L  
POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  
CONTANINATION OR UNTIMELY ACTIVATION O F  
E L E C T R I C A L  EQUIPMENT 
EXPLOSION 
(OVERPRESSURIZATION 
O F  PRESSURE CONTAINING 
I COMPONENTS OR E X T E R N A L  
N 
rP MIXING AND DETONATION O F  H Z  /02 LIQUID AND /OR 
I GAS) 
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
STRAY ENERGY SOURCES; I . E . ,  INTERRUPTION O F  
LIGHTNING, STATIC COMKUNICATION 
ELECTRICITY.  
INADEQUATE E L E C T R I C A L  \ INACTIVATION O F  DETECTION PROTECTION.  AND WARNING SYSTEM. 
OVERLOAD O F  E L E C T R I C A L  LOSS O F  CONTROL 
EQUIPMENT 
LACK O F  "BACK-UP" EQUIPMENT 
LACK O F  F A I L - S A F E  DESIGN I 
.- 
GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES 
P T C P T C '  
B S S S S S S  
B S L S S  G S  
B S S S S S S  
A S S G S S L  
OVERPRESSURIZATION O F  SYSTEM STRUCTURAL DAMAGE O F  
\ I A S S G S S L  AND/OR COMPONENTS. AIRBORNE VEHICLE P R O P E L L A N T  SYSTEM 
FAILURE O F  PRESSURE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE O F  A S S G S S L  
R E L I E F  SYSTEM P R O P E L L A N T  LOADING SYSTEM 
WARMING O F  " T R A P P E D "  GENERATION O F  IMPULSE B S S G S S L  
CRYOGENIC LIQUIDS AND/OR SHOCK WAVES 
F R O Z E N  (SOLID) AIR IN LH2 INITIATION O F  SECONDARY A S S G S S L  
SYSTEM EXPLOSIONS 
CONTANINATION IN LO2 SYSTE FRAGMENTATION DAMAGE T O  A S S G S S L  
(SHOCK IGNITION) OTHER EQUIPMENT 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE O F  \( F I R E  A S S G S S L  
PLUMBING LQND /OR LO 
SYSTEMS WITH IGNITIOI~ 
SOURCE / \ INJURY T O  PERSONNEL B S S C S S L  
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION TIME CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
RATIONALE 
-- 
LESS TIME T O B E A C T  FOR 
SERIES LOADING DUE T O  
POSSIBILITY O F  FAILURE O F  
HIGH F M W  R A T E .  
F A I L  S A F E  
/ALTHOUGH T H E  PROBABILITY 
O F  FAILURES IN BOTH 
SYSTEMS FOR P A R A L L E L  
M A D I N G  IS LESS THAN FOR 
A SINGLE F A I L U R E  FOR 
SERIES LOADING. THE 
CONSEQUENCE IS GREATER 
"IF" I T  SHOULD H A P P E N  
SINCE TWO FLUIDS 
F L O W  SIMULTANEOUSLY 
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
paral lel  method of loading, while both fluids a r e  flowing rapidly through the 
l ines,  it is quite feasible that s t ruc tura l  fragmentation of one sys tem could 
impact on the other. If proper compensations do not exist ,  mixing of the 
two fluids could occur. Under such a condition, the consequence of this 
failure would be grea ter  in par allel  than in ser ies .  A s imilar type of rationale 
and logic was used in assessing the remainder of possible explosion hazard 
effects,  and in al l  cases a greater  hazard was assigned to the paral lel  method 
of loading. 
The hazard labeled "F i re"  on Table 4d shows a possible effect of 
secondary explosions. For  the same reasons a s  explained previously, the 
simultaneous rapid flow in the paral lel  method of loading produces a greater  
c lass  of criticality. For the "Heat and Temperature" hazard a greater  
crit icali ty is again assigned to the occurrence of an explosion under the 
paral lel  method of loading. 
Table 4e defines effects that a r e  related to the hazard of "Leakage. " 
The longer flow time periods associated with parallel  loading make leakage 
a somewhat grea ter  hazard for the paral lel  method of loading, since more  
time is available for fluid to leak f rom the system. It should be noted that, 
although the flow ra te s  a r e  grea ter  in se r i e s  than in parallel ,  the operating 
p ressu res  a r e  approximately the same.  Therefore,  it is pr imar i ly  the t ime 
period that affects the amount of fluid that would leak f rom a given s ize 
opening . 
The effects producing the hazard labeled " P r e s s u r e "  on Tables 4e 
and 4f vary in their relative crit icali ty between s e r i e s  and parallel. As an 
example, if a given component of the sys tem ruptures ,  the resulting hazard 
was considered to be higher in both probability and consequence for the se r i e s  
mode of operation. This was based on the reasoning that the s e r i e s  com- 
ponents a r e  subjected to higher flow ra te s  and a r e  therefore considered to 
have a higher probability of failure,  and that the consequence of such a 
failure,  based on the amount of fluid that would spi l l  due to the rupture,  
would be grea ter  in se r i e s  due to the higher flow ra te .  If, however, such a 
Table 4d. Hazard Assessment 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
HAZARDS- POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES RATIONAL% 
P T C P T C  
F I R E  
-
COMBUSTIBLE MIXTURE O F  SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS A S S G S S L HIGHER F L O W  R A T E S  
(REACTION O F  HYDROGEN " , ' , " $ ~ , " ~ & ~ N D S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N  
OR O T H E R  F U E L S  WITH 
ANY COMBINATION O F  AVAILABLE 
OXYGEN SOURCE SHOCK IGNITION O F  CONTAMINATION O F  MATERIAL C S s s s s s  
CONTAMINATION LHZ AND /OR 
LO,. 
HEAT AND T E M P E R A T U R E  INADEQUATE HEAT 
(HIGH TEMPERATURE.  L O W  DISSIPAT1ON 
T E M P E R A T U R E  AND 
T E M P E R A T U R E  VARIATION. ) LACK OF THERMAL I 
INSULATION f 
CRYOGENIC FLUID LEAKAGE 
AND/OR S P I L L  
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
' I  ASPHYXIATION AND/OR BURNS A S S S S S S  O F  P E R S O N N E L  \ H E A T  AND ITS E F F E C T S  B S S S S S S  
' F I R E  AND /OR EXPLOSION A C S S L S S  POSSIBILITY O F  TWO 
FLUIDS FLOWING A T  T H E  
T I M E  O F  FA1 LURE 
REDUCED MATERIAL STRENGTH C S S S S S S  
REDUCED EQUIPMENT OR R S s s s s s  
COMPONENT L I F E  
INCREASED EVAPORATION RATE C S G S S L S  LONGER EXPOSURE T I M E  
JAMNINC, BINDING OR C S s s s s s  
LOOSENING O F  MOVING P A R T S  
F R O S T B I T E  OR CRYOGENIC B S S S S S S  
BURNS T O  P E R S O N N E L  
INCREASED BRITTLENESS O F  B S S S S S S  
CERTAIN MATERIAL 
CONDENSATION O F  ATMOSPHERIC C S s s s s s  
MOISTURE 
FORMATION O F  LIQUID OR B S S S S S S  
SOLID AIR 
DIMENSION CHANGES O F  SYSTEM C S S S S S S  
COMPONENTS 
HIGH STRESS LEVELS IN CERTAIN B S S S S S S  
COMPONENTS 
\ 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION TIME CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
Table 4e. Hazard Assessment 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
HAZARDS POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES 
P T C P T C  
LEAKAGE CRACKS CAUSED BY FORMATION O F  EXPLOSIVE B S S S S S S  
(ANY S M A L L  STRUCTURAL F A I L U R E  OR F L A M M A B L E  MIXTURE 
UNCONTROLLED F L O W  
O F  ANY F L U I D  INTO, HOLE CAUSED BY I M P A C T  LOSS O F  SYSTEM F L U I D  C S G S S L S  
OUT O F  O R  THROUGH 
THE SYSTEM) WELD AND/OR MANUFACTU LOSS O F  SYSTEM PRESSURE C S G S S L S  D E F E C T S  
INADEQUATELY F I T T E D  O R  CONTAWINATION O F  SYSTEM B S S S S S S  
TIGHTENED P A R T S  
FITTING OR CONNECTOR EXPLOSION AND/OR F I R E  A S S S S S S  
LOOSENED BY VIBRATION 
CORRODED M E T A L  O R  ENTRY O F  AIR INTO PORTION B S S S S S S  
DETERIORATED SEALS, O F  T H E  SYSTEM 
SEATS E T C .  
WORN O R  CONTAMINATED HIGH H E A T  L E A K  O F  V - J  LINE C S G S S L S  
MATING SURFACES. 
EXCESSIVE PRESSURE 
POORLY DESIGNED 
CONNECTIONS I 
PRESSURE OVERPRESSURI ZATION O F  
(HIGH PRESSURE (RELATIVE) ,  SYSTEN OR 
LOW PRESSURE,  AND RAPID 
CHANGES IN PRESSURE) 
INADEQUATE PRESSURE 
R E L I E F  SYSTEM OR V E N T  
FAULTY PRESSURE OR 
R E L I E F  VALVE 
WARMING O F  "TRAPPED" 
CRYOGENIC LIQUIDS I N  A \ 
CLOSED OR INADEQUATELY 
VENTED SYSTEM. / 
A - C A r A S T R O P H I C  
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
INADEQUATE DESIGN F O R  
COLLAPSING FORCES 
COMPONENT AND/OR SYSTEM B L S L G S G  
R U P T U R E  
EXPLOSION A s S G S S L  
FR AGMENTATION AND P R O P E L -  A S S G S S L  
LING O F  COMPONENTS 
LINE WHIPPING (INADEQUATE A s s s s s s  
RESTRAINING DEVICES) 
C O L L A P S E  O F  PRESSURE V E S S E L  A L L S G G S  
OR STORAGE TANK 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION TIME CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
RATIONALE 
LONGER EXPOSURE TIME 
LONGER EXPOSURE TIME 
LONGER EXPOSURE T I M E  
LARGER COMPONENTS AND 
LINES, HIGHER F L O W  
R A T E S  FOR S E R I E S  
LOADING 
SAME AS EXPLOSION 
HAZARD 
MORE ENERGY DUE T O  
HIGHER F L O W  RATES 
F L O W  R A T E S  AND REACTION 
T I M E  
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
Table 41. Hazard Assessment 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  
- ---
GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES RATIONALE H * Z * R T ) S  - -  
P T C P T C  
CONT. PRESSURE 
SHOCK 
(MECHANICAL AND /OR 
F L U I D  SHOCK) 
PUMPING O F  FLUID I \ CAVITATION 
VALVE OPENING OR C 
AND SUBSEQUENT C O L L A P S E  
EXPANSION O F  FLUID 
A RESTRICTION 
LOSS O F  CONTROL O F  FLUID I I LEAKAGE O F  FLUIDS F L O W  \ SPILLAGE O F  FLUIDS 
IMPACT AND/OR IMPULSE DETONATION O F  EXPLOSIVE 
MIXTURE 
EXPLOSION DAMAGE O F  EQUIPMENT,  
COMPONENTS AND/OR SYSTEM 
ACCELERATION DETONATION O F  CONTAMINATED 
CHANGE O F  F L O W  CONTROL 
VALVE POSITION 
SUDDEN OPENING O F  STRUCTURAL FAILURE,  DAMAGE 
O F  VALVE OR RUPTURE O F  SYSTEM AND/OR 
COMPONENT / ( FLUID HAMMER 
B S S S S S S  
B S s s s s s  
B S L L S G G F L O W R A T E S  
C S G S S L S  LONGER F L O W  TIMES 
A S L S S G S  F L O W  R A T E S  
A s s s s s s  
B S S S S S S  
A S S S S S S  
B S L L S G G F L O W R A T E S  
STRESS REVERSALS CYCLIC CHANGES IN STRESS STRUCTURAL FAILURE AND/OR A S S G S S L T W O F L U I D S F L O W I N G  
(VIBRATING OR OSCILLATING "OM DAMAGE AS A RESULT O F  
EQUIPMENT AND/OR FLUID)  ~ ~ , " ~ , " , " ~ S ' O N  AND THE MATERIAL FATIGUE 
CHILLDO WN OPERATIONS 
PRESSURE CYCLING 
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
- 
T - REACTION TIME CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
failure would resul t  in an explosion, the hazard is considered to be greater in 
~ a r  allel, because the potential fragmentation could cause a failure in the 
other rapidly flowing fluid lines, resulting in the mixing of fluids. 
For the effect resulting in line whipping, it was considered that the 
hazard was greater  in se r i es  due to the higher flow ra te  of that method. 
For the effect labeled "Collapse of P ressure  Vessel or Storage Tank, " 
the hazard was judged more  cri t ical  for the ser ies  method of loading, The 
higher flow ra tes  of that system create a higher probability of too rapid 
chill of the vehicle or other portions of the system. As a resul t ,  it i.s 
feasible to produce reduced pressures  within enclosed volumes. This can 
cause a collapse of vehicle tanks and of other types of ground storage tanks. 
Such occurrences have actually been recorded in the past. This hazard is 
therefore labeled greater for ser ies  than for parallel loading. 
Tables 4f, 4g, and 4h present other assessments  where differences in 
hazard between se r i es  and parallel loading were found. The rationale that 
were used to a s s e s s  these differences were quite similar to those previously 
explained. As a general rule,  the higher flow ra tes  in the se r i es  operation 
would resul t  in greater  consequences of failure, if a failure in a given fluid 
system occurred without affecting the other fluid system. For example, if 
the ser ies  line bursts ,  more  fluid could spill  because of higher flow rattes 
and larger  line sizing. This would present a greater fire hazard potential. 
Additionally, the thermal shock potential of the higher spill r a te  would be 
greater in the ser ies  system. 
Should a failure in one fluid system propagate a failure in the other 
(e. g., a LO line ruptures and causes a LH2 line to rupture),  the consequence 2 
of the failure would be greater  for the parallel loading system since both 
LO2 and LH2 systems would probably be operating a t  high flow ra tes  when 
the failure occurs. Although this type of failure can occur in the ser ies  
loading system, the resulting hazard would not be a s  great  since both 
propellants would not be flowing a t  the time and therefore large quantities 
could not be mixed. 
Table 4g. Hazard Assessment  
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
HAZARDS POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  GROSS P A R A L L E L  SERIES RATIONALE 
-- 
P T C P T C  
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE OR I M P A C T  O F  D R O P P E D  OR EXPLOSION AND/OR F I R E  
~?X'~JR& P R O P E L L E D  O B J E C T  
(ANY PORTION O F  T H E  
M A D  OR STRESS 
I SYSTEM SUBJECT ANY MECHANICAL SHOCK AND FLUID LEAKAGE OF FLUID 
HAMMER a 
EXPLOSION (I I S P I L L A G E  O F  LIQUID CRYOGEN 
OVER LOADED AND /OR OVER - BENDING AND DISTORTION 
PRESSURIZED LEADING T O  FATIGUE F A I L U R E  
FATIGUE FAILURE O F  MATER STRESS CONCENTRATIONS AND 
CRACKING O F  MATERIAL 
STRESS CONCENTRATIONS R U P T U R E  O F  PRESSURE 
VESSEL, LINES OR OTHER 
COMPONENTS 
INADEQUATE DESIGN STRENG CRUSHING OR COLLAPSING 
O F  CONTAINER OR STRUCTURE 
F I R E  AND HEAT DAMAGE UNCONTROLLED F L U I D  F L O W  
1MPULSE AND MOMENTUN 
CONSIDERATIONS 
CARELESS MAINTENANCE 
P R A C T I C E  
VIBRATIONS PUMPING OPERATION AND FATIGUE O F  MATERIAL 
(MECHANICAL OR FLUID)  EFFECTS 
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D - NEGLIGIBLE 
A S S G S S L TWO FLUIDS FLOWING 
C S G S S L S  LONGER EXPOSURE T I M E  
A S L L S C G F L O W R A T E S  
B S S S S S S  
B S S S S S S  
A S L L S G G F L O W R A T E S  
A S L L S G G F L O W R A T E S  
A S L L S G G F L O W R A T E S  
B S S S S S S  
CHILLDOWN E F F E C T S  LOOSENING O F  MECHANICALLY B s S S S S S  
CONNECTED COMPONENTS 
CAVITATION ( \ PRESSURE WAVES AND IMPULSE B S L L S C C FLOW R A T E S  
FLUID HAMMER CHATTERING O F  SPRING T Y P E  C S S S S S S  
VALVES 
FALSE READING O F  INSTR UMENTA- B S L S S G S  FLOW RATES 
TION 
F R A C T U R E  O F  B R I T T L E  B S s s s s s  
MATERIAL 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION TIM? CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
Table 4h. Hazard Assessment 
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 
HAZARDS POSSIBLE CAUSES POSSIBLE E F F E C T S  GROSS PARALLEL SERIES 
. . 
RATIONALE 
P T C P T C  
WEATHER AND MOISTURE: RAIN, FOG, HAIL, MOISTURE CONTAMINATION AND B '3 s s s s s  
- SNOW CONDENSATION 
(MAJOR PORTION O F  SYSTEM TEMPERATURE EXTREMES LQCATED OUTSIDE) TEMPERATURE CYCLING O F  C S S S S S S  SYSTEM 
WIND CORROSION C S S S S S S  
LIGHTNING \ ) IMPACT DAMAGE FROM HAIL C S S S S S S  
AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION: f ( STRUCTURAL OVERLOADS C S S S S S S  
DIRT, SALTS, AIR I T S E L F  AND FROM HIGH WINDS 
ETC.  \ I 
SOLAR RADIATION 
A - CATASTROPHIC 
B - CRITICAL 
C - MARGINAL 
D. - NEGLIGIBLE 
ENTRANCE O F  CONTAMINATES B S S S S S S  
INTO THE SYSTEM 
LOSS O F  ELECTRICAL POWER, B S L S S G S  FLOW RATES 
POWER TRANSIENT, ELECTRICAL 
SHOCK, INADVERTANT ACTIVATION 
O F  ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS. 
P - PROBABILITY O F  FAILURE 
T - REACTION TIME CRITICALITY 
C - CONSEQUENCE CRITICALITY 
G - GREATER 
S - SAME 
L - LESS 
C. HAZARD ASSESSMENT SUMMARY AND 
COMPENSATING PROVISIONS 
Upon completion of the hazard assessment ,  those hazards where 
differences appeared between paral lel  and se r i e s  loading were summarized 
in Table 5. (Where a hazard was a s sessed  a s  grea ter ,  in either parallel  
o r  se r i e s ,  it has been indicated on the summary tables. ) There were no 
cases where hazards appeared a s  greater  under one of the classes  of cri-ti- 
calities in both paral lel  and ser ies .  Therefore,  it was possible to discon- 
tinue the distinction between the classes  of hazards for the purpose of the 
summary sheets. The rationale indicated on the previous tables is repeated 
on the summary sheets for better visibility of the data. 
The causes of the hazards were  then evaluated to determine any com- 
pensation provisions that would be made. As an example, with reference to 
the hazard labeled "Acceleration" on Table 5, the possible effect of excessive 
p ressu re  can be compensated for by controlling the t ime of opening and 
closing of valves to l imit  the amount of p ressu re  surge. Ln the case of a~ 
s t ruc tura l  failure for the same hazard, it i s  possible to compensate for the 
higher potential spill  f rom a s t rnc tura l  failure in the se r i e s  sys tem by 
providing isolation valves a t  s t rategic  points in the lines. These valves can 
be closed in case of a failure,  thereby limiting the amount of spill. For an 
explosion hazard,  where a grea ter  hazard exists  in the paral lel  sys tem due 
to the potential mixing of two fluids a t  high flow ra te s ,  compensation can also 
be achieved by providing bar r icades  and retaining dikes, by preventing the 
crossing of l ines containing the two different fluids, and by not running them 
adjacent to each other. Similar logic was used to a r r i v e  at  a l l  the compen- 
sating provisions shown in Table 5. 
An evaluation of the 29 effects ,  where differences in crit icali ty of the 
hazards between parallel  and se r i e s  appeared, showed that by providing the 
compensating provisions shown on Table 5, the hazards could be essentially 
equalized between the paral lel  and s e r  ies methods. Incorporation of the 
compensating provisions would, however, increase the cost  of the sys tem 
thus negating the potential cost  savings expected for a parallel  system,, 



D. VEHICLE TANKAGE HAZARDS 
An investigation of the differential in hazard between the ser ies  and 
parallel loading methods was made based upon the degree of fullness of the 
vehicle tanks for each method. 
1. E x ~ l o s  ive Potential 
Figures 2 and 3 graphically show the percent of total propellant loading 
within given periods of time for the series and parallel methods, respec- 
tively. The rates indicated on these figures were used to plot the explosive 
potential of the vehicle a t  various points in time during the propellant loading 
operations (See Fig. 8). The assumptions were made that an explosive 
hazard exists only when LH2 is on board, and, when excess LO is available, 2 
only the amount required for a stoichiometric reaction would be included. 
Using these assumptions, the explosive potential of the fluids in the 
vehicle tanks during the ser ies  method of loading was evaluated. S h c e  
only the vapor from the small amount of LH2 required to chill down the 
fuel tank is on board during the f i rs t  40 minutes of operation, zero explosive 
hazard is considered to exist during this time period. At 40  minutes, liquid 
LH2 would s ta r t  to fill the LH2 vehicle tanks, and this amount of LH2 could 
react  with the LO already loaded into the LO vehicle tanks. The explosive 2 2 
potential of the mixture would r i se  in accordance with the rate shown on the 
curve in Fig. 8 due to the increasing amount of LH2 that would be loaded into 
the tank. 
For the parallel method of loading, a similar rationale was used. The 
explosive potential of the mixture of LH2 and LO2 would r ise  as indicated by 
the curve on Fig. 8. Since for the parallel loading method, LH2 is loaded 
almost simultaneously into the tanks with the LO the explosive potential 2 
would s tar t  to increase a t  an earlier time than the ser ies  method. This 
increase, however, would be a t  a slower rate. 
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Ln order to evaluate the overall difference in explosive potential 
between the parallel and series loading methods over the total propellant 
loading time, the area  under the curves was calculated and used as  an 
indication of which method presented the greatest explosive potential. It 
was assumed that launch would take place very soon after propellant loading, 
As indicated on Fig. 8, parallel loading resulted in an area  under the curve 
of 53. 1 explosive -potential-hr compared to 35.3 explosive -po tential-hr for 
the ser ies method. The indication, therefore, exists that parallel loading 
presents a greater overall explosive hazard from a standpoint of fluid 
contained in the vehicle tanks than the series loading method. It can be 
noted that by increasing the parallel loading rates,  the time periods for 
parallel loading could be equalized with the ser  ies loading, and equal areas 
under the curves could be obtained. 
2. F i re  Hazard 
An evaluation of the f ire hazard   resented by the fluid contained in the 
vehicle tanks was made and is shown in Fig. 9. The evaluation attempts to 
normalize the degree of fire hazard by expressing this hazard in terms of 
the heat released by burning of available combustible materials. It was 
assumed that during the time periods when LH2 is not available, any LO2 
contained in the vehicle tanks could combine with the available metals as  
fuel for combustion; however, when LH2 is available, the LO2 would have 
a preference to combine with the LH as  opposed to metals. The heat 2 ' 
releases shown in Fig. 9 are  based on the propellant loading rates shown in 
Figs. 2 and 3 and the amounts of heat released if a fire loading would stop 
a t  the initiation of any fire. 
In the case of ser ies  loading, only LO2 is available during the f irst  4 0  
minutes. Therefore, the potential heat release shown in Fig. 9 for series 
loading in the 10- to 40-min time period is the result of LO2 combining with 
the vehicle structure. It will be noted that the heat release is a constant 
60 percent in the approximately 20- to 40-min time period since sufficient 
LO2 is on-board the vehicle after 20 minutes of loading time to entirely 

consume the vehicle. At 40 minutes into the ser ies  propellant loading 
sequence, LH2 would s ta r t  to enter the vehicle tanks and, should a fire 
occur after this time, LH2, in addition to the vehicle materials,  would be 
available for combustion. The addition of LH2 as  a fuel for combustion 
is reflected in the increased slope of the series heat release curve in the 
approximately 40-  to 55 -min time period with the maximum potential heat 
release occurring a t  55 minutes. The heat release in the approximately 
55- to 65-min time period reflects the combustion of the excess LOZ (the 
LO2 remaining after all  the LH2 is consumed) and the remaining vehicle 
materials. After approximately 65 minutes, the fire hazard, as expressed 
by potential heat release, becomes equal for both the series and parallel 
methods of propellant loading. The fire hazard for time periods beyond 
approximately 65 minutes can be considered as independent of the loading 
method used. 
For the parallel method of loading, LO2 and LHZ a re  available for 
combustion in accordance with the assumption made that LO has a preference 2 
for LHZ. The heat release as a result of the combustion of the two fluids 
is indicated with reference to the loading rates shown in Fig. 4. 
The areas  under the curves were calculated to indicate the relative 
amount of heat released using the two methods of loading. For the series 
loading, the heat release is 83 heat-release-hr as  compared to 49 heat- 
release-hr for the parallel method. These values indicate a higher heat 
release (fire) hazard for the ser ies  method. 
3 .  Drain Time 
Drain time is utilized as  an indicator of the relative safety of backout 
operations for the two methods of propellant loading. The relative time 
needed to drain the propellants f rom a fully loaded vehicle was evaluated 
using the fill and drain line sizes indicated in Figs. 4 and 6. Drain times 
will be less for the series loading method since, for equal loading time,, the 
series method requires larger line sizes which will provide a greater drain 
rate capability. Based on the assumption that constant pressure in. the 
vehicle propellant tanks is used to transfer the fluids from the vehicle into 
the storage tank, the relative drain time was calculated and is shown in 
Fig. 10. It can be seen that LH can be drained in approximately 25 percent 2 
of the time, using the ser ies  line s ize,  as  compared to the parallel line size, 
and that the LO2 can be drained in approximately 13 percent of the time, 
using the ser ies  line size, as  compared to the parallel line size. 
E. EFFECT OF VARYING LOADING TIME 
While most  of the previous observations were  based on equal loading 
times of 75 min for the se r i es  and parallel methods of loading, some of the 
compensating provisions require a variation in loading time to obtain the 
compensations stated. The change in time is implicit in the lowering or 
raising of flow ra tes  to reduce or equalize several  of the hazards. Conse- 
quently, some comments a r e  made pertaining to the effect of varying load 
time s . 
For the parallel loading method, the greater propellant loading s ys tern 
explosion potential can be reduced, but not completely equalized, by 
increasing the loading time. The greater  vehicle explosion potential and 
backout time can be equalized by making the load ra tes  approximately equal 
to the se r i es  method load rates .  Since simultaneous flow of fluids takes 
place in the parallel method, this would decrease the loading time to approxi- 
mately one-half the ser ies  time. 
For the ser ies  loading method, the greater propellant loading system 
potential spillage, with resulting fire and thermal shock hazards, and th.e 
greater potential for s tructural  damage czn be equalized by decreasing flow 
rates .  This would increase the loading time to approximately twice the 
parallel loading time. In contrast to this, the greater vehicle f i r e  hazard 
can be equalized by increasing flow ra tes ,  so that l e s s  time is available for 
the combination of the LO with the metal in the vehicle structure. This 2 
would thereby decrease the loading time. 
A reduction of the parallel loading time to approximately one-half the 
ser ies  t ime would equalize rapid load ra tes  between ser ies  and parallel and 
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would therefore require  equal line s izes  for both se r i e s  and parallel  methods. 
As a resul t ,  the explosive hazard of the fluids in the vehicle tank, the backout 
t ime, the propellant loading sys tem line spillage, and the s t ruc tura l  damage 
potentials would be equalized between the paral lel  and se r i e s  methods. How- 
ever ,  the explosion potential of the propellant loading sys tem lines wou1.d be 
increased somewhat since s imultaneous rapid flow of the two fluids a t  a 
higher r a t e  would occur. The f i re  hazard due to the fluid s tored in the vehicle 
tank would s t i l l  be higher for the s e r  ies method of operation, since LO2 would 
be available for combus tion with the mater ia ls  in the vehicle s t ructure.  
V. SUMMARY 
The resul ts  of the study on the relative hazards of parallel versus 
ser ies  loading of the Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS) propellants a r e  summarized 
in the following sections. 
A. SERLES LOADING 
The basic difference between the ser ies  and parallel methods of 
loading is that with the ser ies  method, approximately twice the flow ra te  
would exist in each of the lines. L£ a failure in any one of the lines should 
occur,  the potential for larger  amounts of spillage would exist. This would 
create a greater hazard with respect  to f i re  and thermal shock of surrounding 
structures.  Additionally, the faster filling of the vehicle tanks also creates 
a potentially greater hazard relative to structur a1 damage of components. 
An assessment of the relative f i re  hazards of the two loading methods 
indicates that a higher hazard exists for the ser ies  loading method. The f ire  
hazard was evaluated a s  a function of potential heat re lease  in the event of a 
vehicle fire.  Heat re lease  is directly relatable to the LO2 available to sup- 
port combustion of the vehicle s tructural  materials.  A comparison of the 
loading methods presented in Figs. 2 and 3 will show that the ser ies  method 
provides larger  quantities of LO to support combustion earl ier  in the loading 2 
cycle than does the parallel method. 
B. PARALLEL LOADING 
The par allel loading method allows lower flows in both the LH2 and 
LO systems than the ser ies  method. However, if a failure in one of the 2 
systems should create a failure in the other system, the potential for mixing 
of the two fluids a t  rapid flow ra tes  exists. This would create a greater 
explosion hazard than the se r  ies method of loading, where only one of these 
fluids is flowing at rapid ra tes  a t  any one time. With respect  to the fluids 
in the vehicle tanks, it was shown that a greater  explosive potential exists 
for this method and that the backout t ime to drain vehicle tanks would be 
greater because of the smaller  line size. 
C. COMPENSATING PROVISIONS 
With r ega rd  to compensating provisions to reduce or  equalize the 
hazards between the two systems,  the following comments a r e  made. 
1. Ser ies  Loading Compensation 
Because of the potential for greater  spillage, isolation valves can be 
installed a t  cr i t ical  locations in the loading system. These isolation valves 
would allow shutoff where s t ruc tura l  failures have occurred and could isolate 
that section. The higher p ressu re  surges  created by the higher s e r i e s  
flows can be controlled by providing precis  ion controls to regulate the greater  
valve closing or  opening surges.  The time period during which the vehicle 
is exposed to a grea ter  f i re  hazard than during the paral lel  loading method is 
due to the availability of LOZ to combine with the vehicle s t ruc ture ;  it can be 
reduced, however, by increasing the LOZ flow rate .  
2. Para l le l  Loading Compensation 
For  the paral lel  method of loading, compensating provisions can be 
provided to reduce or avoid fluid mixing by providing barr icades and dikes, 
eliminating the crossing of l ines,  and avoiding lines containing different 
fluids in close proximity to each other. The explosion potential due to fluid 
mixing a s  a resul t  of s t ruc tura l  failure of the propellant loading lines can be 
reduced by lowering the flow ra tes .  The explosion potential of the fluid in the 
vehicle tanks can be equalized relat ive to the se r i e s  method by raising th.e 
flow ra te s  s o  that the fill ra tes  of the par al le l  method of loading would equal 
that of the s e r i e s  method of loading. These higher flow ra te s  necessary  to 
decrease the explosion potential of the fluid in the vehicle tanks would requi re  
la rger  fi l l  l ines,  thereby also providing an equalization of the drain time 
between paral lel  and s e r  ie s loading. 
D. E F F E C T  O F  VARYING LOADING TIMES SUMMARY 
A reduction of the paral lel  loading time to approximately one-half the 
se r i e s  loading time would equalize rapid load ra t e s  between se r i e s  and 
paral lel  loading, and would, therefore,  requi re  equal line s izes  for both 
series and parallel methods. As a result,  the explosive hazard of the 
fluids in the vehicle tank, the backout time, the propellant loading system 
line spillage, and the structural damage potentials would be equalized 
be tween the par allel and the series method. However, the explos ion 2otential 
of the propellant loading system lines would be increased somewhat since 
simultaneous rapid flow of the two fluids at a higher rate would occur. The 
fire hazard due to the fluid stored in the vehicle tank would still be higher 
for the ser ies  method of operation, since LO2 would be available for com- 
bustion with the materials in the vehicle structure. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An evaluation of the overall hazards pertaining to the propellant loading 
of the space shuttle leads to the conclusion that for equal total loading times 
the parallel loading method is potentially more  hazardous than the ser ies  
method of loading. 
It was shown that the reduction of parallel loading time to approximately 
one -half the se r i es  time would essentially equalize the differences in hazards 
between parallel and ser ies .  However, because equalization of loading time 
would require the same line size, valves, and other equipment as  for the 
ser ies  system, the economic advantage of the parallel method of loading 
would be negated if this method were employed. 
If it is assumed that only a relatively small  percentage of missions 
will require a reaction time that necessitates loading propellants in 75 
minutes, and that 150 minutes could be used for propellant loading for the 
majority of miss  ions, then advantage can be taken of the smaller size and 
lower cost of the parallel method of loading. The system can be designed 
so that it would normally be operated in ser ies ,  allowing approximately 
150 minutes to load the vehicle tanks. For the vehicles that require the 
shor t  reaction time of 75 minutes, the identical system which was sized for 
150-minute ser ies  loading can be operated in parallel to load the vehicle in 
75 minutes. In this manner,  the smaller  line s izes can be used, and the 
potential cost advantage of the parallel system as  reported in Ref. 1 can be 
realized. 
It is recommended that the hazards and compensation provisions noted 
in the hazard analysis be utilized to formulate system safety design cr i te r ia  
for the space shuttle propellant loading system. 
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